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POLLUTION CONTROL PRACTICE IN
SOUTH CARLINA-AN OVERVIEW
ADAM FISHER, JR. AND CLARK GASTON, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

President Richard M. Nixon speaking on the occasion of the 50th
Anniversary of the United States Junior Chamber of Commerce in St.
Louis, Missouri, on June 25, 1970, made the following comments concerning our environment:
Consider the problem that has been so much on the minds of
many of our young people, and older people who have any sense
of the perspective of history and what could happen in the years
ahead-the problems of the environment.
I remember that in my time when you had smoke coming
from factories that was a good sign, a sign of progress, a sign of
jobs, a sign of production.
But times have changed. If I can put it in symbolic terms, as
far as the factory is concerned what we need to do is increase and
improve the jobs, increase the production, and eliminate the
smoke.
My friends, that is why, as we look ahead ten, fifteen, twenty
years from now, we can have the most productive economy in the
world, but we will have cities that are choked with traffic, suffocated with smog, poisoned by water, and terrorized by crime-unless we act now.'

Today it is in vogue to be an environmentalist. Not only have
politicians discovered that paying homage to a clean environment can
substitute for baby kissing, but the news media has recognized that an
oil leak off the shores of California can be of as much interest to
readers as a sensational murder case. Pollution is a severe and increasing problem of which the courts and other branches of government have
become acutely conscious. 2 It is rapidly becoming a daily topic of
conversation. This article will present the various legal aspects of this
* Both authors: LL.B., University of South Carolina School of Law; currently with
Mann, Foster & Brissey, Greenville, South Carolina.
I. President Richard M. Nixon speaking at the 50th Anniversary of the United
States Chamber of Commerce in St. Louis, Missouri, on June 25, 1970.
2. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1970).
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topic.3 Such discussion will treat only briefly federal legislation and
foreign states' approaches to the problem. 4 Emphasis will be placed on
the South Carolina Pollution Control Act.5 It is to be noted at the
outset that the body of law known as pollution control law is still in
its infancy and as such is developing rapidly. Consequently, it may be
difficult to successfully apply the principles of stare decisis, and there
will be occasions when newly promulgated law and regulations must
be tested against the yardstick of the Constitution.
TYPES OF POLLUTION

Included in any comprehensive approach to a pollution problem
is consideration of the three basic mediums: air, water and land. Air
pollution would include pollution from solids, vapor, gases, noise and
odor. Water pollution encompasses solid, liquid, and gas entrainment,
along with a heat differential factor. Land pollution would occur primarily with respect to waste disposal and vibration.' While there are
several ways of organizing an approach to the subject of pollution, it
is felt that primary delineation by medium, i.e., air, land, and water
would be of most benefit to the average practitioner when confronted
with a situation involving actual or potential pollution. However, further subclassifications can be made, as between statutory and nonstatutory remedies.
NON-STATUTORY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

There are several common law actions used to provide relief from
the pollution of the environment. These actions should be available for
cases involving pollution of either air, water or land.
3. Considered as being beyond the scope of this article are municipal and county
ordinances. There is at the outset a practical problem with respect to the enforcement of
these ordinances due to limited funds to allocate the complex instruments required to
properly classify the potential pollution, qualitatively and quantitatively. Nevertheless,

such ordinances do exist and are a factor to consider in any approach to a client's case
involving defense or attack of potential pollution.
4. Every state has enacted some form of pollution control statute.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-195 etseq. (Supp. 1970).
6. An example of the latter is found in the case of Davis v. Palneno Quarries, 212
S.C. 496, 48 S.E.2d 329 (1948). Here the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's stone
quarry was operated in such a manner as to cause unreasonable vibration of the earth

to take place, and that consequently it constituted a nuisance.
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A.

Negligence

The application of theories of negligence to pollution problems in
South Carolina is illustrated by the case of Conestee Mills v. City o]
Greenville.7 In this case the plaintiff was engaged in the manufacturing
of cotton goods with its principal place of business below the city of
Greenville on the Reedy River. The defendant, City of Greenville, discharged its raw sewage into the same river some distance upstream. The
court permitted the suit stating:
The action in the instant case is grounded, not upon the construction of the sewerage system, which was authorized by the legislature, but upon the negligence of defendant in the operation of that
system-for which a cause of action clearly lies. It follows, therefore, that successive injuries arising from the negligent operation
of the defendant's sewerage system give right to successive actions,
and that the plaintiff can recover for injuries occuring after its
purchase of the property in question."
Continued negligent acts after repeated complaints give rise to both
actual and punitive damages.' The defendant may further be enjoined
from future acts."'
B.

Nuisance

Prior to the advent of the pollution control statutes, an oft-used
basis for relief against pollution was the nuisance doctrine. In South
Carolina, nuisances have been divided into two categories, nuisance per
se and nuisance per accidens. The court in Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co.," differentiated between the two as follows:
Now, clearly, a fertilizer mixing plant is not a "nuisance per se,"
that is, a thing which is a nuisance anywhere and under all circumstances. If it is a nuisance at all, it is what is called a "nuisance
per accidens," that is, by reason of its location and other circumstances, such as the community in which it is2 located, or the
manner in which it is constructed or conducted.'
7. 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931).
8. Id. at 19, 158 S.E. at 116 (citations omitted).
9. See Jackson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 317 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1963).
10. See Griffin v. National Light &Thorium Co., 79 S.C. 351, 60 S.E. 702 (1908).
II. 102 S.C.442, 86 S.E. 817 (1915).
12. Id. at 451, 86 S.E. at 820.
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Negligence on the part of the defendant is not a requisite to a cause of
action founded on a nuisance theory."3 This absence substantially lessens the plaintiff's burden of proof. 4 Further, injunctive relief is available as a matter of right in the nuisance case," except where a monetary
award for future damages is given.'
In pollution suits under the nuisance doctrine, attempts have been
made by defendants to obtain samples for analysis of the damaged
property of a plaintiff. The South Carolina courts have heretofore
denied these requests, stating:
There is no provision in our statutes authorizing the Court to
require a party in a pending case to produce and permit his adversary to inspect an article or chattel in his possession or under his
control. . . . The omission in these statutes of any reference to the
power now under consideration is quite significant. That the lack

of such power may, in certain cases, result in an injustice may be
conceded. 7
This problem has been somewhat alleviated by the state's new liberal
discovery rules, patterned similarly to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 8 which now permit inspection of objects.' 9
Several defenses are available in nuisance cases, including those of
laches, equitable estoppel, and prescriptive right. The elements of the
defense of laches are delay in the assertion of a right and material
prejudice to the defendant as a result of said delay. 0 The elements of
the defense of equitable estoppel are lack of knowledge and the means
of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question, reliance on the
conduct, acts, language or silence of the party estopped amounting to
a misrepresentation, and action based thereon of such a character as
to change prejudicially the position of the party claiming the estoppel."
The prescriptive right is a successful defense in a nuisance case. To
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
(1964).
21.

Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280 (1894).
See J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480, 175 S.E.2d 847 (1970).
Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1,66 S.E. 117 (1909).
Mason v. Apalache Mills, 81 S.C. 554, 62 S.E. 399 (1908).
Welsh v. Gibbons, 211 S.C. 516, 521-22,46 S.E.2d 147, 149-50 (1948).
28 U.S.C.A. Rule 34 (1968).
S.C. CODE ANN. Cir. Ct. Rule 88 (Supp. 1970).
See Bailey v. Lyman Printing and Finishing Co., 245 S.C. 13, 138 S.E.2d 410
In Re Nettle's Estate, 231 S.C. 214, 97 S.E.2d 897 (1957).
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acquire an easement by prescription, the stream or land subject to the
easement must have been used for a full period of twenty years and all
adversely to the rights of the owner.22
Considerable thought has been given to the applicability of the
doctrine of balance of convenience, but the South Carolina Supreme
Court to date has refused to accept it.2
22. Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1909). In this case
the defendant engaged in gold mining on a stream which flowed through the plaintiff's
lands located below the mine. In 1888 the defendant commenced a new mining process
which was known as the chlorination process. This process produced refuse matter which
was discharged into the stream. When the stream overflowed, the refuse was deposited
onto plaintiff's land which destroyed the ability of the land to support plant life. After
ten years of this, the plaintiff brought suit alleging a nuisance and seeking to recover
damages and an injunction against such practice. He was successful on both counts in
the lower court and affirmed on appeal. The court stated as to the defense of prescriptive
easement, "the time does not begin to run until there is some injury done which would

support the action. The plaintiff's testimony was to the effect that no injury resulted to
her land from the use of the stream by the defendant before the installation of the
'chlorination process'." Thus, it appears that not only must there be an injection into

the stream, but further, some particular injury to the defendant must occur in order to
trigger the 20 year prescriptive period.
23. The balance of convenience doctrine has been stated in Johnson v. Williams,
238 S.C. 623, 121 S.E.2d 223 (1961):

In cases where a mandatory injunction is sought, the general rule in this
country is that the court will balance the benefit of an injunction to the
plaintiff against the inconvenience and damage to the defendant, and grant
an injunction or award damages as seem most consistent with justice and
equity under the circumstances of the case. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 639,
121 S.E.2d at 231.
In this jurisdiction the leading case of Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1,
66 S.E. 117 (1909) in response to this proposition said:
It has been too frequently held by this court to require further discussion
that, when the existence of a nuisance has been established by the verdict
of the jury, the party injured is entitled as a matter of right to an injunction
to prevent its continuance. Whatever may be the doctrine in other states,
under the provisions of the Constitution of this state, that private property
shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, the
court could not have considered, in deciding whether to grant or refuse the
injunction, the question raised by the defendant as to the balance of convenience, or of advantage or disadvantage to the plaintiff and defendant
and the public at large, for the defendant's use of the stream. That question
would be pertinent only in an application addressed to the legislature to
give such corporations the power of condemnation. Id. at 6-7, 66 S.E. at
118. (Citations omitted.)
Accord Dill v. Dance Freight Lines, 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966). See also Boyd
v. Granite Co., 66 S.C. 433, 45 S.E. 10 (1903). For a discussion of the balance of
convenience doctrine, see Malone, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine In the SoutheasternStates, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159 (1952).
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RiparianRights

The common law of South Carolina vests certain rights in proprietors of land which is in actual contact with stream water. These rights,
known as riparian rights, are as follows:
Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river has naturally an
equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream
adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run, without diminution
or alteration. No proprietor has the right to use the water to the
prejudice of other proprietors above or below him, unless he has
a prior right to divert it, or a title to some exclusive enjoyment."

Land, to be riparian, must be in actual contact with the water; proximity without contact is insufficient.2- As to the aspect of pollution, the
doctrine has been expressed as follows:
Owners of land on the banks of a stream are entitled to the
reasonable use of the stream; that they can use the stream for their
own purposes to a reasonable extent; that while it is true that a
stream must not be polluted, still this does not mean that nothing
can be put in the stream; but that nothing can be put therein that

will deprive the landowners below to the reasonable use of the
stream.26
The reasonableness of use is a question of fact, to be determined by the
jury from the circumstances of each particular case, from a consideration of the capacity of the stream, the adaptation of machinery to it,
and the general usage of the country in similar cases.2
Relief is available in the form of damages for past infringements
and an injunction against future violations. 21 It would also be permissible for the aggrieved party if he so elects, to recover future damages
for a continuing violation. In this instance, however, he would forego
29
the right to an injunction.
24. White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254,265,38 S.E. 456, 460 (1901).
25. 56 AM. JUR. Waters § 277 (1947).
26. Duncan v. Union-Buffalo Mills Co., 110 S.C. 302, 306, 96 S.E. 522, 524 (1918).
27. Mason v. Apalache Mills, 81 S.C. 554, 62 S.E. 399 (1908).
28. See White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254, 38 S.E. 456 (1901).
29. Mason v. Apalache Mills, 81 S.C. 554, 62 S.E. 399 (1908). For an excellent
discussion of riparian rights, see Agnor, Riparian Rights In the SoutheasternStates, 5
S.C.L.Q. 141 (1952). It is noted on page 144 in this article that "any pollution of the
water seems to violate the rights of all lower riparian owners. The cases are in agreement
that a pollution of the stream is an actionable infringement of such right."
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FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The federal government has been active in enacting laws controlling pollution. As to noise, there is the Walsh-Healy Act; 3 for radiation, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;31 for pollution in air, the Air
Quality Act of 1967 which amended the Clean Air Act, which was
further amended in 1970 to include considerations of aircraft, vehicles,
fuel and new plant construction."2 Water pollution is addressed in the
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,3 and the 1899 Refuse Act.Y
Solid waste has been addressed in the Solid Waste Disposal Act.3" The
federal government is taking further positive steps, exhibited by, among
other things, the recent creation of the Environmental Protection
36
Agency.
STATE LEGISLATION

The South Carolina Legislature has enacted statutes separate and
additional to those pre-existing common law remedies founded upon
37
negligence, nuisance, and riparian rights. The Pollution Control Act
addresses itself to the mediums of air and water. Radiation is covered
38
in the South Carolina Atomic Energy and Radiation Control Act.
However, only cursory treatment is given by state statutes to the problems of solid wastes or landfill, and there is no state legislation which
regulates noises or vibration.
SOUTH CAROLINA POLLUTION CONTROL ACT

A.

Scope of State Statute

South Carolina has recently enacted the Pollution Control Act
which covers the pollution of air and water. Added to the Act are
regulations, some of which are filed with the Secretary of State as
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

41 U.S.C.A. §§ 35 etseq. (1965).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 35 etseq. (1970).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857 et seq. (1969).
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151 etseq. (1970).
33 U.S.C.A. § 407 (1970).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3251 etseq. (1970).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321 etseq. (Supp. 1971).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-195 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-400.11 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
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recently as April 20, 1971. These regulations define the specific quantitative levels of undesirable solids, liquids and gases which represent
maximum acceptable levels of air and water pollution.
The key provisions of the statute are:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,

negligently or willfully, to throw, drain, run, allow to seep or
otherwise discharge into any of the waters of the State organic or
inorganic matter that shall cause or tend to cause a condition of
pollution.39

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
negligently or willfully, to discharge any air contaminant or other

substance in the ambient air that shall cause an undesirable level. 40
As can be seen, both sections consider virtually the same elements, to
wit, person, negligence or willfulness, contaminant introduced into the
atmosphere or matter into the waters, and water pollution or undesirable level of contaminants in air.
In the event of litigation, actions may be brought by the Pollution

Control Authority or the governing body of the county affected by the
violation." However, it would appear that, prior to suit, the Pollution
Control Authority would attempt to cope with the problem on an
administrative, quasi-judicial basis. 2 The Attorney General shall be the
legal advisor to the Authority and is to assist in the bringing of any
action by the Authority. 3 The defendant, as contemplated by this act,
includes "any individual, public or private corporation, political sub-

division, government agency, municipality, industry, co-partnership,
association, firm, trust, estate or any other legal entity whatsoever.""
The standard of care prescribed by this act, as characterized by South
Carolina cases, is that inadvertent failure to observe due care indicates
mere negligence, and an advertent or conscious failure to observe due
care passes beyond mere negligence into wantonness or wilHfullness.'1
39. S.C. CODE
40. S.C. CODE
41. S.C. CODE
42. Id.

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§ 63-195.12(a) (Supp. 1970).
§ 63-195.14 (Supp. 1970).
§ 63-195.25 (Supp. 1970).

43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.24 (Supp. 1970).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195(l) (Supp. 1970).

45. The definitions of negligence and willfulness and their distinction was aptly
illustrated in the case of Talbert v. Charleston & W.C. Ry.. 75 S.C. 136, 55 S.E. 138
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Water Pollution

South Carolina has adopted by regulation a tiered approach to
water control. The tiers of use of water in South Carolina are as
follows:
AA
Waters suitable for use for domestic and food processing
purposes with disinfection and PH adjustment as only treatment
required. Suitable also for trout survival where so specified and for
uses requiring waters of lesser quality.
A
Waters suitable for use as swimming waters. Suitable also for
other uses requiring waters of lesser quality.
B
Waters suitable for domestic supply after complete treatment
in accordance with requirements of the South Carolina State
Board of Health. Suitable also for propagation of fish, industrial
and agricultural uses and other uses requiring water of lesser quality.
C
Waters suitable for fish survival, industrial and agricultural
uses and other uses requiring water of lesser quality.
And as to salt water:
SA
Waters suitable for shellfishing for market purposes and any
other. usages. Suitable also for uses requiring water of lesser quality.
SB
Waters suitable for bathing and any other usages except
shellfishing for market purposes. Suitable also for uses requiring
water of less quality.
SC
Waters suitable for crabbing, commercial fishing and any
(1906) in which the court approved the trial judge's charge, a portion of which was as
follows:
If you send your little boy, Mr. Foreman, on an errand for you, and tell
him to feed your horse, and he returns to you, and you say to him, 'Did
you feed my horse?' He says, 'No'. You say, 'Why?' He says, 'I forgot
it'. This in inadvertance. But suppose he said to you, 'No; I did not feed
your horse. I recalled the fact you told me to feed your horse, but I did
not want to feed him'. That is willfulness. You know the difference between
a negligent child and a willful child. Id. at 140, 55 S.E. at 139.
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other usages except bathing or other shellfishing for market purposes. Suitable also for uses requiring water of lesser quality."

These standards are defined by technical parameters and should a lawyer be faced with a suit, the consultation of a competent professional
engineer, chemist, ecologist, botanist, or other suitable expert would be
of value inasmuch as the technical aspects of the facts involved are
extremely important. Maintenance of these standards is achieved by
requiring that all persons subject to the Act who desire either to operate
a new waste outlet, or to increase the discharge from an existing outlet,
shall first obtain from the Authority a permit to construct, and a
permit to discharge from such outlet.47 In order for a permit to issue,
the Authority must be able to determine that any proposed discharge
will not lower the classification of the waters receiving the waste. The
primary concern in this matter is effect of the new discharge upon the
recipient waters, rather than the content of the discharge itself. Hence,
it is possible that the same type and quantity of wastes could be acceptably discharged into one body of water, and yet be completely unacceptable if discharged into another.
(2.)

Air Pollution

Unlike water controls, the air pollution regulations do not establish tiered classification standards. In this area, the primary classifications are "ambient" and "source" standards.
"Ambient air" is defined as that portion of the atmosphere outside of buildings and other enclosures, stacks or ducts, which surround
human, plant, or animal life, water or property.' "Source" is defined
as any and all points of origin of air contaminants whether privately
or publicly owned or operated." Thus sources release air contaminants
to yield pollution of ambient air.
It is significant to differentiate between "ambient" and "source"
standards because different classification parameters are used for each.
Permissable ambient air levels are measured in terms of quantities of
46. Section IV of Water Classification -Standards System adopted by the S. C.
Pollution Control Authority and filed with the Secretary of State on April 20, 197 1.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.13 (Supp. 1970).
48. P.C.A. Reg. IA § i, filed February II, 1971.
49. Id.
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sulfur dioxide, suspended particles, carbon monoxide, photochemical
oxidants, non-methane hydrocarbons, and gaseous flourides. Source
levels, on the other hand, are measured only in terms of smoke shade
and rate of dust emission.
Control of air pollution is effected in the same fashion as is control
of water pollution, to wit, by requiring operators of new or increased
yield air contaminant "sources" to obtain permits to construct and
operate such sources. Besides having to comply with dust emission
rates and smoke shade requirements as measured by the Ringleman
Scale, 50 a source will not be allowed to operate until the Authority is
satisfied that it will not cause violation of ambient air standards. And
once granted, permits to operate either outlets of water contaminants
or sources of air contaminants vest no property rights and may be
constrained or revoked if at a later date it is determined that water
quality or ambient air standards are being violated." It is not evident,
however, from the Pollution Control Act, or from the Authority's
regulations, how individual liability may be ascertained in situations
where there are several operators of outlets or sources who are all in
compliance with their permits, but where nevertheless a violation of air
or water standards has occurred.
Measurement of a "source" for compliance with source standards
is effected at the point of origin of the air contaminants.52 Measurements for determinations of water quality are made around and about
the "outlet" which is the terminus of a sewer system or the point of
emergence of any water-borne sewage or other wastes into the waters
of the state.53 Ambient air standards are the same throughout the state.
(3.)

Noise and Radiation Pollution
South Carolina has at this point enacted no restrictions concern-

50. The Ringelmann Smoke Chart is designed primarily for the detection of combustion produced black soot particles. It measures coloration and not opacity. The
Ringelmann Smoke Chart has been widely accepted throughout the United States as a
measurement of air pollution by both legislatures and courts. Sittner v. City of Seattle,
62 Wash.2d 834, 384 P.2d 859 (1963).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 195.16 (Supp. 1970).
52. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195(17) (Supp. 1970); P.C.A. Standard IA, filed
February II, 1971.
53. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195(13) (Supp. 1970).
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ing noise pollution.- However, regulation of radiation is effected by the
South Carolina Atomic Energy and Radiation Control Act. 5 This Act
establishes a Technical Advisory Radiation Control Council which
establishes radiation standards under supervision of the State Board of
Health.-" These standards are filed with the Secretary of State. The
Pollution Control Act deals with neither of these topics.
(4.)

Solid Waste Disposalon Land

Solid waste disposal on land is not covered in the Pollution Con'trol Act, but instead is regulated by the individual counties. Further,
there are criminal sanctions for unauthorized dumping of garbage on
57
the lands of another.
(5.)

Odor

Pollution is defined in the Act to include "discharge. . .of substances . . . which unreasonably interferes with enjoyment of life or use

of property.' '5 s Similar wording is used in the definition of undesirable
level.5 9 This would apparently include the presence of odors."
B.
(1.)

Statutory Procedures
The Hearing

The Authority is vested with the power to conduct a hearing with
54. For an example of noise litigation, see Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co,, 154
N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 1967).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-400.11 etseq. (Supp. 1970).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-400.14 (Supp. 1970).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-396 (Supp. 1970).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195(7) (Supp. 1970).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195(18) (Supp. 1970).
60. The word "odor" has been defined with respect to pollution in the following
manner:
An odor is a substance of gaseous character or a liquid of high vaporizing
quality. The odor of perfume, for example, is an emission of vapor into
the air, caused by evaporation of the liquid vehicle carrying the odoriferous
element. The familiar odor of rotten eggs is the gas hydrogen suflide. The
odor of formaldehyde or acetone is the air-borne vapor of these chemicals.
All are clearly 'substances' within the definition of the word. Department
of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 100 N.J. Super. 366, 392,
242 A.2d 21, 34 (1968).
It is to be noted that odors may be barred under common law nuisance theory. J. D.
Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480, 175 S.E.2d 847 (1970).
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respect to actual or potential pollution." Pursuant to the Act, the
Authority may subpoena witnesses and require the production of evidence."2 A decision made shall be based solely on the record of the
hearing. Such a decision is to include a statement of the facts in controversy, the ruling of the Authority, and the law or regulation upon
which the ruling is based.13 These decisions are to be published
promptly and numbered chronologically with a compilation similar to
the annual reports of the South Carolina Supreme Court," and are to
be made available to the public. 5 Any refusal to obey notice of hearing
or subpoena may result in the Court of Common Pleas issuing an order
requiring compliance, thus permitting contempt proceedings should the
party refuse to honor the dictate of the court." There is no set require67
ment in the state that a hearing must be held prior to issuing an order,
but excepting an emergency situation, 8 it would appear that such a
procedure is required by the constitutional dictates of due process,
where the ruling is of judicial nature as opposed to legislative edict.69
The statute is silent as to the rules of evidence in the hearing. However,
an interested party on request may require a complete transcript of the
proceedings to be filed. 70 The Authority may settle or compromise any
action or cause of action for the recovery of a penalty or damages. 7
(2.) CriminalLiability
The Act places criminal sanction on the "knowing" offender in
the form of a fine of not less than one hundred ($100.00) dollars nor
more than five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars and/or imprisonment for
not more than two years. Each day's violation is considered a separate
72
misdemeanor.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.18 (Supp. 1970).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.21 (Supp. 1970).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.20 (Supp. 1970).

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.22 (Supp. 1970).
67. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.18 (Supp. 1970).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.32 (Supp. 1970).
69. As to necessity of a hearing, see Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U.S.
463 (1905). As to an emergency condition as an exception, see The Apollon, 9 Wheat
(U.S.) 362 (1824). Accord, 16 Am,. JUR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 569 (1964).
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.20 (Supp. 1970).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.8(7) (Supp. 1970).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.35 (Supp. 1970).
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There is some buffer present in that prosecutions for violations of
a final determination or order shall not be instituted until after appeal
or review or the expiration of a period of time permitting this.73 As to
these, prosecutions are initiated only by the Authority or the county
governing body. One-half of any penalty money recovered is given to
74
the county involved.
(3.)

Appeal

Any appeal from the Authority may be taken to the Court of
Common Pleas in the county of the occurrence of the offense within
thirty days of the decision.75 In such event, the court will treat the
matter as if it were an appeal of a case in equity.7" As is established in
this state, matters of equity on appeal are conducted to permit the
appellate court to inquire into the facts of the matter as opposed to
77
being bound to only an inquiry into matters of law.
Further appeal is, as in any civil case, to the state supreme court.78
C.

Relieffrom Statutory Liability
Force Majeure

(1.)

7
A force majeure is defined as a superior or irresistible force. 1
Relief from liability in the presence of such a force is available in the
Act as a barrier to both civil and criminal liability for pollution
"caused by an act of God, war, strike, riot, or other catastrophe as to
which negligence on the part of such person was not the proximate
80
cause."

Conditions Within Boundariesof Industry

(2.)

The Act denies the Authority the right to affect "air conditions
existing solely within the industrial boundaries of commercial and inSee S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.25 (Supp. 1970).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.36 (Supp. 1970).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.23 (Supp. 1970).
Id.
Twitty v. Harrison, 230 S.C. 174, 94 S.E.2d 879 (1956).
78. S.C. CONST. art. V § 4.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

79.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

774 (4th ed. 1968).

80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.33 (Supp. 1970).
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dustrial plants, works or shops."'" The physical extent of the boundaries would appear to be in a vertical direction to the "stack height"
and horizontally to the situs property limits. It would appear further
that any water pollution within the confines of the plant would be
beyond the purview of the Act.
(3.)

Variances

Additional time is permitted to comply with the order of the Authority by way of variance, if after considering the following items, the
Authority deems such time reasonable:
(a) The character and degree of injury to, or interference with,
the health and physical property of the peoples;
(b) The social and economic value of the source of the undesirable levels;
(c) The question of priorty of location in the area involved; and
(d) The technical practicability and economic reasonableness of
reducing or eliminating the emissions resulting from such source. 2
(4.)

Impossibility

The defense of impossibility of compliance has been successful in
another jurisdiction where there was an inability to reduce the pollution." South Carolina's Act is silent on this point.
(5.)

Electric Utilities

Electric utilities are exempt from liability if a permit had been
issued to such utility and upon this permit the "utility acted in good
faith and constructed its plant in accordance with these requirements.""
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.29 (Supp. 1970).
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.15 (Supp. 1970). An added factor of relief is
provided in the event that any action by the Pollution Control Authority will result in
an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or in the practical closing and elimination of any lawful business, occupation or activity, without sufficient corresponding
benefit or advantage to the people. Such relief must be limited in time and conditioned
upon periodic reports to the Authority. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.17 (1967).
83. See City of Kankakee v. New York Cent. R.R., 387 Il1. 109, 55 N.E.2d 87
(1944). Contra, Consolidated Coal Co. v. Kandle, 105 N.J. Super. 104, 251 A.2d 295
(1969).
84. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.17(a) (Supp. 1970).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1971

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 5 [1971], Art. 2
CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 23

SOUTH

D.

Other Matters

(1.)

Emergency Procedures

The Act permits the Governor and the Authority collectively, in
the presence of an emergency, to "issue an order reciting the existence
of such an emergency and require that such action be taken as the
Authority deems necessary to meet the emergency." ' - Such action may,
be the statute, be taken without notice or hearing, and the protection
of "public health" is used to justify such ex parte proceedings." The
affected party has the right to a hearing within forty-eight hours of
application for same, but the length of time of such order is until such
time as "an emergency no longer exists.""
(2.)

New and Existing Construction

By the device of the permit, the South Carolina Pollution Control
Authority imposes controls on the construction of any and all alterations of existing sources, disposal systems and outlets and new construction concerning the same." This permit requirement addresses
itself to both air and water controls. Presently, certain items are excluded from this restriction, including space heating systems of less
than 500,000 BTU/hr., dwellings of four families or less, and motor
vehicles. 9 It is possible for the Authority to later revise permit requirements based on availability of personnel and monitering equipment.
(3.)

Traffic Hazards

The regulations additionally affect traffic hazards and place the
burden on a party emitting smoke from open burning causing a reduction of visibility to 2,400 feet or less, to contact the South Carolina
Highway Department and immediately attempt to reduce the problem.9"
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.32 (Supp. 1970).
86. Id.

87. Id.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.14 (Supp. 1970). However, the State Board of

Health is responsible for issuing construction permits for septic tanks for all private
residences and for subdivisions of 250 units or less. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-8(11) (Supp.

1970).
89. P.C.A. Reg. IA § II, filed February 11,1971.
90. P.C.A. Reg. 2A § II, filed February I1,1971.
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Presently, direct source emission control for vehicles is still unregulated, although the ambient air standards for photochemicals and
carbon monoxide appear to be aimed at the control of auto emission.
(4.)

Open Burning

Open burning has received considerable attention at the regulation
level in the Pollution Control Authority operations. 9' The regulations
prohibit open burning except in certain instances, among which are the
open burning of leaves, tree branches, yard trimmings, rubbish and
garbage on the premises of private residences or dwellings of four
families or less.
(5.) PrivateSuit
The Act provides for a private cause of action arising from any
violation of the statute. The damaged party, however, may not rely on
any finding of the Pollution Control Authority to create any presumption in law or fact. However, it would seem that the person damaged
could benefit by being able to subpoena the investigative work product
92
of the Authority, assuming it is not related to industrial secrets.
E. Doctrineof PrimaryJurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires a complainant in
court first to seek relief in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts, even though the matter is properly
93
presented to the court as a matter within its jurisdiction.
The application of this doctrine yields uniformity and consistency
in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency,94 and
further gives expertise in the determination of extremely technical,
91. P.C.A. Reg. 2A § 1. filed February 11, 1971.
92. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-195.28 & .30 (Supp. 1970).
93. 2 AM. JUR. 2d Admin. Law § 788 (1962). Some jurisdictions have adopted this
doctrine. See Larwood Co. v. San Diego Fed. Say. and Loan Assn., 8 Cal. Rptr. 362
(4th Cir. Ct. App. 1960); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Weiss, 113 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1959);
Hoffman v. Garden State Farms, Inc., 76 N.J. Super. 189, 184 A.2d 4 (1962); Schmidt
v. Old Union Stockyards Co., 58 Wash. 478, 364 P.2d 23 (1961). Others have rejected
it. See Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 (1948).
94. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
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complicated and scientific problems. 5 Court jurisdiction is not ousted,
but only postponed."0 In a recent action in Michigan,"7 it appears that
the city of Whitehall and the Whitehall Leather Company were discharging improperly treated wastes into White Lake. A local organization brought a court action to abate the nuisance. The appellate court
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applied and further affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The
court stated:
It is well established that a proper party may sue for damages or
seek injunctive relief to abate a nuisance such as water pollution.
Both before and after the enactment of the Water Resources Commission Act, such actions have been brought. The act itself contemplates that existing common law remedies are not abolished.
But it is in just such a case, one of concurrent jurisdiction of the
courts (to enjoin a nuisance) and of an administrative agency (to
regulate and prohibit pollution) that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction operates."'
The court continued by stating that the aggrieved party could challenge
the administrative body's finding by appeal or could later initiate an
action in equity to abate the nuisance if it still felt aggrieved.
An analysis of the case and the statutes involved
degree of similarity between the South Carolina Pollution
and the Water Resources Commission Act of Michigan."5
private action,10 create a regulatory agency, and deal with

reveal some
Control Act
Both permit
pollution.

No pollution case before the South Carolina Supreme Court to
date has addressed itself to the question of the applicability of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. However, in Ex Parte Jones' the
court cast some doubt on the application of the doctrine in any case in
South Carolina. In that case, the defendants had been engaged in trucking operations between Charleston and Conway, and other cities, without a permit from the Railroad Commission of South Carolina. The
95. Ellison v. Rayonier Inc., 156 F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Wash. 1957).

96. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
97. White Lake Improvement Assn. v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 177
N.W.2d 473 (1970).

98. 177 N.W.2d at 481.
99. M.C.L.A. §§ 323.1 etseq. (1969).
100. M.C.L.A. § 323.12 (1969); S.C. CODE
101. 160S.C. 63, 158 S.E. 134 (1931).

ANN.
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plaintiff brought action in court to restrain the defendants from so
operating. The defendants then petitioned the supreme court for a writ
of prohibition to prevent further circuit court action, basing the application for the writ on the theory that the commission, rather than the
court, had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. The
court dismissed the application for the writ and allowed the action to
proceed dispite the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs' should
have initially sought redress before the Railroad Commission. The
pertinent act, however, provided that it should not be construed "to
deprive any person or persons of any right of action to which he is
entitled to under the law, but shall be construed as cumulative."''0 2 The
court seized on this language to permit the lower court proceedings to
continue. Arguably this is a refusal to adopt the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
In the more recent case of South CarolinaPublic Service A uthority v. CarolinaPower and Light Co.,10 3 the plaintiff Authority alleged
that it had entered into a contract to provide electrical power to a new
plant in Georgetown County and that thereafter, the defendant, without having obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Public Service Commission, began construction of a low
voltage line for the purpose of supplying power to the same plant. The
plaintiff sought an injunction against the defendant on the ground that
the defendant had failed to obtain the required certification from the
Commission. The court agreed that certification was the next step;
however, it dismissed the action on the ground that the commission was
vested with exclusive original jurisdiction for determination of the regulatory matter. The court thus appeared to give weight to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.' In its opinion, the court
discussed Ex Parte Jones and stated that the determination of that
102. 1925 S.C. STATUTES AT LARGE, Act No. 170.
103. 244 S.C. 466, 137 S.E.2d 507 (1964).
104. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a
remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must be sought by exhausting
this remedy before the courts will act. 2 Am.JUR. 2d Admin. Law § 595 (1962). The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is like the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies in that each is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the
courts and administrative agencies, permitting the courts to obtain expert aid in the
solution of technical problems, and preventing premature action in court. The net result
of the application of either doctrine is practically the same in many cases. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
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matter was not within the jurisdiction of the administrative agency. The
court said that where, as here, the question of whether or not the
defendant is required to have a certificate of convenience and necessity
is in issue, jurisdiction to determine such question has been conferred
solely upon the Public Service Commission.
It remains to be seen whether the court intended this result to
apply only to situations wherein an agency has exclusive jurisdiction
or whether in cases of concurrent jurisdiction a similar result may be
reached.
ATTACKS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POLLUTION CONTROL STATUTES AND PROCEDURES

As yet no case has been decided by the South Carolina Supreme

Court directly considering the constitutionality of the Pollution Control Act. There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of a
statute, and the burden of proving its unconstitutionality is an extremely formidable one.' Other jurisdictions have dealt with pollution
acts with respect to vagueness, equal protection, due process, search
and seizure, the interstate commerce clause, and the preemption doctrine.
A.

Vagueness

Attacks have been made on the basis that a statute which imposes
civil and criminal penalties must specify the prohibited conduct in
terms that are clear, precise, definite and certain, or prescribe some
comprehensible guide, rule or information as to what must be done or
06
what must be avoided.
remedies in that the latter applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
administrative agency alone, judicial interferance being withheld until the administrative

process has run its course and the agency action is ripe for review. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, the
judicial process being suspended pending referral of certain issues to the administrative
agency. 2 AM. JUR. 2d Admin. Law § 790 (1962).
105. Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 100 N.J. Super.
366, 242 A.2d 21 (1968).
106. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc. 2d 920, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup.

Ct. 1969). It is not clear from the case as to whether or not specific pollution standards
were established by the statute that was challenged. It would appear that, in any event,
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The courts' response to this argument has been that the statute
affords prior notice and an opportunity to file plans, 10 7 or that the
defendant knew of the nature and origin of his violation.'
B.

Equal Protection

It has been unsuccessfully asserted that pollution statutes violate
the equal protection clause. The court in Oriental Boulevard Co. v.
Heller"' in response to this argument stated:
A class may lawfully be restrictive, if the lines defining the restriction are not arbitrary altogether, and the rule to be applied within
them is uniform and even; and a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary so as to constitute a denial of the equal
protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it." °
C.

Deprivationof Property Without Due Process

Another attack commonly used against statutory enactments is
that such statutes deprive the owner of his property without due process
of law. This argument has yielded in the past to the right of the state
to safeguard the public health."' In this same vein, an attempt was
made to overturn a pollution statute on the basis that the additional
the trial court would permit a hearing prior to imposing any sanction. The S.C. Pollution
Control Act, on the other hand, sets forth certain quantitative standards by chemical
compound and rate of emission.
As to the S.C. position on vagueness, in the recent case of Town of Honea Path v.
Flynn, 255 S.C. 32, 176 S.E.2d 564 (1970), the court said:
It is a general principle of Statutory Law that a statute must be definite
to be valid. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law. Id. at 39, 176 S.E.2d at 567.
107. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc. 2d 920, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
108. Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 100 N.J. Super.
366, 242 A.2d 21 (1968).
109. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc. 2d 920, 297 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup.
Ct. 1969) (citations omitted). See also Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522 (1959).
110. 297 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
111. See generally Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Pacific Gas and Elec.
Co. v. Police Court, 251 U.S. 22 (1919); Shealy v. Southern Ry. Co., 127 S.C. 15, 120
S.E. 561 (1924).
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new restrictions constituted a deprivation of property without due process. The court in Oriental Boulevard rejected this argument, stating:
The rule is that an owner of property who has constructed or
maintained his property in compliance with laws then in existence
acquires no vested right or immunity against an exercise of the
police power which imposes additional or new requirements with
respect to the maintenance or use of such property."'
D. Illegal Search and Seizure
Another approach taken argues that a pollution statute is unconstitutional in that it authorizes unlawful searches and seizures of property without a warrant. This argument was held without merit in
OrientalBoulevard. The court said:
The fact that some of the Air Control Pollution Department's
personnel may have made searches of owners' premises in certain
case without obtaining a warrant, does not render the law itself
unconstitutional though it may be that a property owner would
have a sufficient defense or right of redress in court against any
such searches."'
The court seemed to distinguish the United States Supreme Court
decisions of Camara v. Municipal Court"' and See v. City of Seatle"
on the basis that they hold invalid the searches but not the statute
authorizing the search. These landmark cases expressly provide that
searches of private residences and commercial business establishments
by public inspectors must be either with consent of the proprietor or
112. 297 N.Y.S.2d 431,441 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
113. 297 N.Y.S.2d 431,442 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
114. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), held that administrative
searches by municipal health and safety inspectors require either consent or the element
of a search warrant in order to satisfy the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court further held that probable cause to issue the warrant for the inspection of a
dwelling by municipal health and safety officials must exist if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting area inspections are to be satisfied. Such standards may vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the
passage of time, the nature of the building, or the condition of the entire area, but they
will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular
dwelling.
115. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), held that under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, a fire inspector must obtain either consent or a warrant authorizing entry into a business establishment, and thus extended the Camara holding to
businesses as well. See 20 S.C.L. Rgv. 363 (1968).
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else under color of a valid search warrant. The South Carolina Pollution Control Act provides:
[The Authority may] enter at all reasonable times in or upon any
property, public or private, for the purpose of inspecting and investigating conditions relating to pollution or the possible pollution of the air or the waters of the State and its authorized agent
may examine any records or memoranda pertaining to the operation of a disposal system or source. Provided, that the Authority
shall not enter private residences or dwellings of four families or
less, to inspect and investigate any conditions which the Authority
shall have reasonable cause to believe to be a source of air contaminant unless authorized. The results of any such inspection shall
be reduced to writing and a copy shall be furnished to the owner
or operator of the source or disposal system." '
It would appear, however, that in light of the present search and seizure
doctrine, to wit, Camara and See, any search of residential or business
property. of any nature, made under authority of this Act, must be
either with the proprietors' consent or else by authority of a proper
search warrant.
E. Interstate Commerce
The question of the right of a state to affect matters of interstate
commerce in respect to pollution control was squarely raised in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit"' where the Court held that the states
had the right to regulate air quality through the vehicle of police power,
notwithstanding the question of interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that
people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of the most traditional
concept of the states' police power."'
F.

The Preemption Doctrine

An attempt was made in Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v.
State"' to deny the validity of a state pollution statute, arguing that
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-195.8(23) (Supp. 1970).
117. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
118. It should be noted, however, that the South Carolina Pollution Control Regulations expressly exclude from its provisions all interstate motor vehicles and rolling
stock. S.C. CODE ANN. Vol. 17 at 341 (Supp. 1970).
119. 456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1970).
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the federal legislation on the subject preempted and voided the state
statute. The court rejected this argument by citing numerous references
to federal acts which give the states the right to control pollution and
further stated that, "Congress finds that the prevention and control of
air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and
local governments." 2 0
CONCLUSION

As can be seen, common law doctrines as supplemented by the
Pollution Control Act present a comprhensive array of remedies applicable to the problems of air and water pollution. The Pollution Control Act does not, on its face, attempt to interfere with existing nonstatutory remedies; yet any imposition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would certainly have this effect. A South Carolina defense
attorney, when handling a pollution suit, may well attempt to invoke
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction for temporary relief, and when
faced with a statutory offense resort to attacks on the statute's constitutional validity.
On the other hand, a plaintiff's attorney should note that the
Pollution Control Act clearly gives a damaged party a right upon
which to found a private cause of action for violation of pollution
standards. This private right may also be used to argue that the legislature did not intend that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should
apply, if faced with this defense.
In any event, during the development of the law in this area, a
proper perspective should be maintained similar to the reasoning of the
court in the recent Florida case of St. Regis PaperCo. v. State:",
Ecology is the in subject of today's citizenry. Man, of all
animals, pollutes his habitat the greatest. What we have defiled
over a period of 100 years cannot be sanitized in one day, one
month, one year, or by one law. Now is not the time to discard
the concepts of due process, fair play and substitute 'quick justice'
in the name of 'kill the pollutants.'

An essential mandate to this agency [Florida Air and Water
120. Id. at 772.
121. 237 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1970).
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Pollution Control Commission] is the seeking out of pollutants
and presenting to he violator an opportunity to abate the unlawful
practice. The emphasis is upon prevention and abatement; not
upon enriching the coffers of the State treasury or its prison population. The legislative scheme is primarily directed towards reestablishing a livable habitat for man; not the abatement or elimination of the industries and governmental units which are guilty
of polluting our environment.'2
These statements seem to present the preferred balance and mood of
today's society along with an indication of the discretiont that the new
South Carolina Pollution Control Authority will hopefully use as it
attempts to cope with the problems of abatement and control of pollution throughout the State.

122. Id. at 798, 800.
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